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Abstract 
 
In this article I reflect upon potential reasons for the seemingly persistent impression 
that Dynamic Testing has not delivered on its promise. Potential reasons are 
embedded in a paradox. On the one hand validity-related expectations towards 
dynamic tests seem too broad. This includes fuzziness in defining the diagnostic 
target constructs, a simplistic quantitative focus on conventional validity indices, 
and overgeneralised expectations regarding incremental validity. At the same time 
the focus on Dynamic Testing seems too narrow. By introducing three tests of 
cognitive flexibility, I exemplify that Dynamic Testing has potential which goes 
beyond the assessment of learning potential in specific sub-populations. My 
ambition is to help addressing potential users’ misconceptions about Dynamic 
Testing productively. 
 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Testing; Incremental Validity; Sensitivity and Specificity; 
Cognitive Flexibility; Learning ability 
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The umbrella that is too wide and yet too small: Why Dynamic Testing has still not 
delivered on the promise that was never made 
 
 
In this paper1, I will reflect upon the apparently adamant perception that Dynamic 
Testing has not delivered on its promise. I will argue that a paradox might have 
evolved under the umbrella term “Dynamic Testing”. It is the paradox of being too 
broad and too narrow. 
I was re-reminded on this rather old issue after I recently moved to the North-
East of England to take up a position at Durham University’s School of Education. 
One of the exciting things when starting somewhere new is that one has the chance 
to talk to colleagues outside and far beyond the more or less close circle of 
collaborators and researchers who are working in the same area or closely related 
fields as oneself. Unfortunately, this initial phase of reciprocal interest wears off all 
too quickly. In one of those conversations around the proverbial water cooler (which 
in most cases is a tea pot in Northern England) I mentioned Dynamic Testing as one 
of the areas I have worked in. And there it was: One colleague’s reaction – who is a 
well-respected expert in large-scale assessments in education – was partly expected 
but also quite disconcerting. His response was something like “Interesting! Yes, of 
course, I have heard about it. But what a shame that they never really have delivered 
on their promises.” I leave it to you to guess which part was expected and which one 
was worrying. In the following I would like to reflect upon promises, expectations, 
and perceptions that underpin the apparently quite persistent sentiment about 
Dynamic Testing. I would like to thank the editor of this Journal for providing me 
with the opportunity to do that to an extent that would have gone beyond this 
Darjeeling moment a few months back.  
 
We have been hearing this rather sobering evaluation of the perceived utility of 
Dynamic Testing for almost 30 years. The fact that we have been hearing it not only 
from potential test users (or, rather non-users) but also from colleagues who worked 
or have been working in the field of Dynamic Testing makes it even more 
disconcerting.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This paper is a slightly extended version of a keynote given at the XIV Conference of the 
International Association for Cognitive Education and Psychology in Leiden, Netherland.	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In this article, I intend to share some deliberations of potential reasons for this 
problem. I will do this in four parts. First, I will speculate about the nature of the 
promise that Dynamic Testing has supposedly not being able to keep. Then I will 
argue that a too broad perspective on the potential of Dynamic Testing may 
contribute to some unrealistic expectations. In the third part I will explain that 
perspectives on Dynamic Testing might be too narrow at the same time. Whilst 
reflecting upon this paradox of being too broad and yet too narrow, I will provide 
suggestions as to how to take forward our efforts (a) to continue developing useful 
tests and to successfully prove their usefulness, (b) to foster a more differentiated yet 
more encompassing perspective on Dynamic Testing, which hopefully will help (c) 
to address potential users’ misconceptions of Dynamic Testing more productively. 
 
Promise, what promise? 
The first question to ask is what expectations were nurtured by making what 
promise that was supposedly not being kept. In the context of testing in general, the 
central “promise” of a test is in regard to its validity. The question in the context of 
Dynamic Testing is whether the impression of a broken promise can also be linked 
to validity-related doubts. In case of an affirmative answer to this question one could 
argue that the accumulated mass of validity studies, reported either in individual 
papers or compiled in voluminous readers, can be interpreted as sufficient evidence 
for refuting the claim of a broken promise. In fact, one would have a hard time 
finding studies where a test that could rightfully claim the label “dynamic test” 
failed to predict a criterion of some sort. Of course, this argument is not very 
convincing for at least three reasons: (1) its arbitrariness in what counts as a dynamic 
test, (2) its neglect of a potential publication bias, and (3) its lack of specificity 
regarding to the criterion.  
A negative response to the question whether the perception of Dynamic 
testing not delivering on its promise is validity-related derives from the question, 
how many test-related validity studies does it take to validate a test concept such as 
Dynamic Testing2? The answer here is “none”. According to the prominent 
definition of validity as the appropriateness, meaningfulness and usefulness of the 
inferences drawn from test scores (e.g., Cronbach, 1971) we have to acknowledge 
that validity is not about a test concept and, strictly speaking, not even for a test as 
such.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Lidz & Elliott (2000) would be a rich source for that.  
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Although this insight might rather be disorientating at first, it draws our 
attention to another important aspect. Dynamic Testing as an approach to 
assessment is anything but homogeneous. Dynamic Testing should be seen as an 
umbrella term for a wide range of assessment tools that share a set of features3. The 
list of test features often associated with Dynamic Testing includes: provision of 
feedback, hints, thinking prompts, retries, re-testing after training phases and so 
forth. The purpose of implementing these kinds of features into a test procedure is to 
elicit information about test takers’ learning potential (Hessels, 2009), learning ability 
(Guthke, 1982), intellectual change potential (Beckmann, 2001), cognitive 
modifiability (Tzuriel, 2013), reserve capacity (Kliegl	  &	  Baltes,	  1987), and others. In 
this context Dynamic Testing is deemed of particular use for specific target 
populations such as low socioeconomic status (SES) children, disadvantaged 
minorities, children with learning difficulties and so forth. Although this list is far 
from being comprehensive it is already diverse enough to signify the heterogeneity 
of Dynamic Testing. Its heterogeneity, in particular with regard to the diversity of 
target constructs, imposes a substantial challenge to a validation of tests that employ 
features of Dynamic Testing. 
So, what is Dynamic Testing, anyway? In reference to Guthke and Wiedl’s 
definition (Guthke & Wiedl, 1996, p. 8; Guthke & Beckmann, 2000, p. 179; Guthke, 
Beckmann & Wiedl, 2003, p. 225), I see Dynamic Testing as a methodological 
approach to psychometric assessment that uses systematic variations of task 
characteristics and / or situational characteristics in the presentation of test items 
with the intention to evoke intra-individual variability in test performance. 
Interindividual differences in intraindividual variation are seen as more adequately 
reflecting the dynamics in the organisation of human behaviour. It is the systematic 
variation of task and situational characteristics in the item presentation within the 
test process that justifies the adjective “dynamic” as a qualifier of this assessment 
approach. Again, may any contention towards this definition that might be 
experienced by some readers be appreciated as a proof in point regarding the 
heterogeneity of this test concept. What also becomes apparent is that this definition 
intentionally lacks any reference to a target construct, i.e. information regarding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Of course, on a different level, one might argue that there is a range of more or less shared 
epistemological, philosophical, ethical and other factors that underpin the implementation of said 
features. However, the emphasis would be on “more or less shared” as it is not always apparent 
that similar things are done for the same reason. Hence, I suggest to “reserve” these considerations 
for the construct validity discussion.  
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what it is that we want to assess using Dynamic Testing. This dissociation of means 
and end, i.e. assessment approach and assessment target, is necessary before we can 
refocus on the validity issue. In the following, I use the label dynamic tests for 
assessment procedures that use features of Dynamic Testing as defined.  
 
Too broad … 
Test validation often takes the form of looking at correlations between the test scores 
and some criterion measures, which then is discussed as predictive or criterion 
validity. In the context of validation of tests that utilise Dynamic Testing there are a 
range of challenges. Three include the criterion, the construct, and the comparison. A 
successful prediction of a criterion, which is often interpreted as criterion-related 
validity, only becomes a constituent of construct validity if the criterion represents 
an operationalization of the target construct. For example, in a validation of learning 
tests one would have to expect a substantial link between test scores and a criterion 
that represents an operationalization of learning ability. The construct relevance of 
the criterion, of course, needs to be established prior to ascertaining test-criterion 
correlations to avoid a post hoc reframing of the criterion’s relevance that would 
then help “save the test’s reputation”4. In the context of alleged under-deliveries on 
(validity-orientated) promises, where outcomes of dynamic tests do not succeed in 
predicting some “real-life” criteria such as other test scores, teacher ratings or school 
grades do not necessarily justify doubts regarding the construct validity of dynamic 
tests. 
The conceptual heterogeneity of Dynamic Testing has consequences with 
regard to validation strategies. Presuming that “intellectual change potential” does 
indeed refer to a different construct than, say, “learning ability” and assuming both 
differ from “cognitive modifiability”, “cognitive reserve capacity”, or “learning 
potential” then attempts to establish construct validity for the respective (dynamic) 
test have to focus on more or less different criteria. As a result, one might be 
confronted with a situation where, say dynamic tests of learning ability might be 
more successful than dynamic tests of cognitive modifiability. This, however, would 
not tell us much about whether Dynamic Testing has or has not delivered on its 
promise. Each test (that utilises Dynamic Testing) has to demonstrate its value in its 
own right. In other words, the methodological umbrella of “Dynamic Testing” can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is where the circular nature of operational definitions of constructs imposes a severe challenge 
to validation. 
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provide neither plenipotentiary absolution nor generalised condemnation regarding 
(validity) promises.  
The validity argument cannot be made convincingly by simply referring to 
sufficiently high correlations between test scores and a (even well-defined and 
construct-relevant) criterion (see Figure 1a). One might interpret the “promise” of 
dynamic tests in terms of being able to better predict a given criterion than existing 
assessment tools. This refers to the expectation to provide an increment in 
information that ultimately will improve “ … the appropriateness, meaningfulness 
and usefulness of the specific inferences made from test scores” (AERA, APA, & 
NCME, 1995, p. 9; Cronbach, 1971; Messick, 1989). This notion of incremental 
validity suggests a comparison, which in the case of learning tests, would have to be 
a comparison to existing or traditional approaches to the assessment of intellectual 
capacities, in short, intelligence tests. However, a simple comparison of correlation 
coefficients will not be expedient. Traditional intelligence tests are to a considerable 
extent a product of a long self-consolidating process in which item and test 
refinement were informed by the very criteria that are also elements of operational 
definitions of the construct intelligence itself. Hence, it should not come as a surprise 
to find a result similar to what is exemplified in Figure 1b, where static, non-
dynamic tests are at least as successful in predicting a criterion. Does this mean 
dynamic tests are not delivering on their promise? 
 a)	   	   	   	   b)	   	   	   	   c)	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  
 
Figure 1: Perspectives on criterion related and construct validation (explanation in text, LT = learning 
test, ST = static test, C = criterion, CL = criterion representing an operationalization of learning 
ability, VLT = incremental validity of LT). 
 
As has been previously argued (e.g., Beckmann & Guthke, 1999, p. 145; Beckmann & 
Dobat, 2000; Beckmann, 2001, p. 154) the strategy to establish incremental validity of 
(dynamic) tests needs to build on a construct-related argument, which has a 
LT
CL
ST
C
VLT
LT ST
CL
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predominantly qualitative focus. In contrast, a quantitative comparison of correlation 
coefficients would merely establish whether a test is successful in measuring more of 
the same. Learning tests, however, should not be expected to better predict 
construct-irrelevant criteria. In other words, the quantitative aspect of this 
comparison is secondary; the raison d'être of dynamic tests rests with their ability to 
predict behaviours that are qualitatively different from what is measured by 
traditional non-dynamic (i.e., static) tests. Although traditional static intelligence 
tests tend to focus on indirect manifestations5 of learning at best, incremental 
construct validity of learning tests needs to be established through predictions of 
direct manifestations of the ability to learn, to benefit from feedback, or to respond to 
mediation etc. In statistical terms, incremental validity refers to LT-specific beta 
weights in regression analyses as depicted in Figure 1c (see section labelled “VLT“). 
What also should help resisting the temptation of a simplistic “mine-is-larger-then-
yours” competition is the awareness that there are two situations in which section 
“VLT“ could in fact be smaller than its ST-related counterpart (i.e., “VST”) and yet no 
validity-related pessimism would be warranted. One such situation could result 
from focussing on an inappropriate criterion. For example a criterion might be an 
insufficient operationalization of the ability to learn because interindividual 
differences in performance scores are mainly determined by the amount of prior 
exposure to learning opportunities. A lack of prediction (i.e., insubstantial “VLT“) 
under these circumstances could cautiously be interpreted as discriminant validity 
of the learning test under scrutiny.  
There is another situation where we in fact expect “VLT“ to be smaller than 
“VST“ to demonstrate construct validity of learning tests (for a more elaborated 
version of this argument, see Beckmann, 2006). As pointed out earlier, dynamic tests 
of learning ability seem often to focus on particular sub-populations, such as ethnic 
minorities, SES-disadvantaged children, or children with learning difficulties. This 
happens for a reason. The underlying assumption of learning tests is that for those 
test takers test performance shown under traditional test conditions is not 
necessarily indicative of their intellectual potential. Therefore, learning opportunities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The prototype of indirect manifestations of the ability to learn is Wechsler’s argument that “… the 
number of words a man knows is at once a measure of his learning ability…” However, for the sake 
of fairness, it is necessary to add that Wechsler continues in stating that “The one serious stricture 
that can be made against the vocabulary test as a measure of a man’s intelligence is that the number 
of words a man acquires must necessarily be influenced by his educational and cultural 
opportunities” (Wechsler, 1935, p. 98-99). This, obviously, represents a plea for more direct 
measures of learning ability. 
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are incorporated in the test procedure, which (a) makes tests dynamic and (b) 
justifies their labelling as learning tests. Test scores, as they are now a construct 
adequate operationalization of learning ability, are expected to reflect individual 
differences in the ability to utilise those learning opportunities. Learning 
opportunities will be offered in form of thinking prompts, hints, or system of 
graduated feedback after failing to provide a correct answer to a problem presented 
in the test. Test takers’ responsiveness to those mediations represents the 
operationalization of their potential to learn. For test takers, however, who are able 
to provide correct answers to test items without an extensive need for mediating 
support the test procedure becomes more similar to what we find in traditional, non-
dynamic tests. For this group of test takers the dynamic tests are not expected to 
provide incremental information. Figure 2 depicts a situation where panel 2a shows 
the result pattern expected for the “target population” and panel 2b shows the result 
pattern likely to be observed in test takers for whom performance scores in non-
dynamic, static tests (“ST”) represents a sufficiently valid, although indirect estimate 
of their cognitive potential.  
 a)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   b)	  
	   	   	   	   
Figure 2: Differential aspect of incremental validity (explanation in text, LT = learning test, ST = static 
test, CL = criterion representing an operationalization of learning ability, VLT = incremental 
validity of LT). 
 
Such result pattern where the same test seems to measure different constructs 
in different populations indicates so-called differential validity (e.g. Urbina, 2004, p. 
196), which is usually discussed as a threat to a test’s validity. In the context of 
learning tests, however, I would argue that differential validity is more an indication 
of construct validity rather than a threat. The major insight that follows from these 
considerations is that generalised quantitative expectations regarding manifestations 
LT
CL
ST
VDT
CL
LT ST
VDT
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of incremental validity are inappropriate. Validity-related expectations need to be 
grounded in a priori specifications of construct-relevant behaviour used as a 
criterion as well as in construct-relevant specifications of a target population. In 
other words, expectations regarding incremental validity should be constraint to the 
target population. Otherwise we run the risk of overstating claims (or indirectly 
encouraging unrealistic expectations) of “superiority always and everywhere” 
(Beckmann, 2006). 
A prominent expectation towards dynamic tests is based on their claim to 
identify potential rather than manifested abilities. In the context of learning tests, 
this expectation is nurtured by the assessment process focussing on direct 
manifestations of learning within the test situation itself. The quality of a diagnostic 
decision or prediction is dependent on two aspects, sensitivity and specificity. The 
(doubly) latent nature of potential requires first and foremost high levels of 
sensitivity in a test for its identification. Sensitivity, in this context, refers to not 
missing any indications of potential in test takers. Increases in sensitivity can be 
achieved via a reduction of “false negatives” (Figure 3). To achieve an overall 
improvement in the quality of prediction (e.g., in form of incremental validity as 
discussed earlier) increases in sensitivity should not be accompanied by an increase 
of “false positives”, which would constitute a sacrifice of specificity (Beckmann, 
2001, p. 156). In the given context, maintaining high levels of specificity means to 
avoid "seeing" potential where there might be none. 
 
  Criterion: 
  Success No success 
Inference 
based on 
test score: 
“Potential” True positive False positive 
“No potential” False negative True negative 
  Sensitivity =TP/(TP+FN) 
Specificity 
=TN/(TN+FP) 
 
Figure 3: Sensitivity and Specificity in the context of diagnostic categorisation. 
 
So far I have discussed, admittedly quite cursorily, a few issues that in my 
view may contribute to unrealistic expectations and subsequently to some rather 
inauspicious perceptions of Dynamic Testing. The common denominator between 
these issues seems to be a too broad, or undifferentiated perspective on Dynamic 
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Testing. A necessary specification and clarification is to be achieved by considering 
that (a) Dynamic Testing as a test concept cannot be validated as such; (b) tests that 
utilise dynamic testing need to be validated in their own right; (c) as with any test 
evaluation, a validation of dynamic tests has to start with a clear definition of the 
target construct, target population and envisioned purpose of their use; (d) a precise 
construct definition lays the foundation for the qualitative – rather than a simplistic 
quantitative – focus on the attempts to establish incremental validity, which means 
to demonstrate whether the dynamic test under scrutiny is able to predict construct-
relevant behaviour (operationalized via an appropriate criterion) that competing 
traditional approaches cannot, and (e) by using tests of learning potential as an 
example, incremental validity is to be achieved via an increase in the sensitivity 
aspect of a prediction without sacrificing its specificity. 
 
… and yet too narrow 
In the remainder of this paper I will reflect upon the second part of the paradox. 
After arguing that a too broad and undifferentiated view on Dynamic Testing might 
facilitate unrealistic expectations, the point I want to make in the following is that 
the prevalent discussions around Dynamic Testing are at the same time too narrowly 
focused on (a) a small yet insufficiently sub-differentiated range of constructs, and 
(b) particular sub-populations. Both issues may also contribute to impressions that 
Dynamic Testing has not utilised its potential. 
Discussions of Dynamic Testing that identify learning ability, or cognitive 
modifiability (or any other of its conceptual derivatives) as its exclusive target tend 
to remind me of a “definition” of football (or soccer, for our transatlantic colleagues). 
After England’s loss of the 14th FIFA World Cup semi-finals to Germany, Gary 
Lineker supposedly said, “Football is a simple game. Twenty-two men chase a ball 
for 90 minutes and at the end, the Germans always win”. As some will appreciate, 
the Germans in fact do win occasionally (even in Brazil), others, however, will 
appreciate that they do not win always. Hence, dynamic testing should not 
automatically be equated with the assessment of learning ability6.  
In the following I propose that the umbrella term “Dynamic Testing” is far 
more encompassing and accommodating than it is often perceived. The main 
underpinning argument for utilising dynamic test procedures for the assessment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 What could be said, however, is that tests that aim to measure learning ability should (a) utilise 
Dynamic Testing, i.e. should be dynamic tests, and (b) should appropriately be labelled as Learning 
Tests. 
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learning ability is that test behaviour observed in traditional intelligence tests has 
limited representativeness regarding a test taker’s ability to learn. This stands in 
contradiction to the fact that the ability to learn is seen as a core aspect of almost 
every definition of the construct intelligence. In learning tests, however, the 
incorporation of learning opportunities into the test situation itself enables test 
takers to demonstrate their ability to learn; hence their test behaviour represents a 
more direct proxy of the target construct. In short, learning tests, utilising Dynamic 
Testing, address the issue of a discrepancy between conceptualisation (i.e., how we 
define the target construct) and operationalization (i.e., how we measure it). This 
incongruence of conceptualisation and operationalization is more common than we 
prefer. I argue that the same is true for another ability construct7, namely cognitive 
flexibility. 
 
Cognitive Flexibility as the ability to deal with novelty 
When consulting research literature for flexibility-related definitions, we find 
references to an aptitude for changing lines of thinking (Garaigordobil, 2006); to the 
ability to shift across concepts and situations (Chi, 1997), to adaptive functioning 
(Hund & Plumert, 2005), to the ability to change one’s mindset (Frensch & Sternberg, 
1989), to the ability to adjust to changing demands (Lezak, 1995; Scott, 1962), to an 
ability to switch modes of response (Kossowska, 1996) etc. The unifying element of 
those and other definitions seems to be the ability to deal with novelty (Sternberg, 
1987). What also becomes apparent is that all these definitions look disturbingly 
similar to definitions of intelligence. Many definitions of intelligence more or less 
explicitly refer to the ability to deal with novelty or the ability to adjust to changing 
demands. As one of many examples, according to William Stern, who is considered 
the originator of the individual differences perspective in psychology, intelligence “ 
… is a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new 
requirements: it is general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions in 
life” (Stern, 1914, p. 3). Carroll’s definition of fluid intelligence as the ability to apply 
a variety of mental operations to solve novel problems, ones that don’t benefit from 
past learning or experience (Carroll, 1993), provides another example for the 
conceptual overlap between intelligence and the ability to deal with novelty. 
According to these and many other definitions, “all things flexible” seem to already 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This is not to preclude that the same argument can also be made in relation to non-cognitive 
constructs in the field of personality assessment (see Guthke, Beckmann, & Wiedl, 2003). 
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be covered by the construct of (fluid) intelligence. If so, then in emphasising the 
importance of the construct cognitive flexibility we once again might have fallen for 
what McNemar called the first cardinal principle of psychological progress: Give 
new names to old things (McNemar, 1964, p. 872). In my view, however, the 
alarming familiarity refers rather to the situation described in the context of the 
measurement of learning ability. As it appears, it is another example of the 
discrepancy between conceptualisation and operationalisation. Based on the premise 
that test behaviour should be indicative of the ability construct aimed to measure, 
the question emerges in the context of cognitive flexibility, to what extent do 
traditional intelligence tests enable examinees to demonstrate their ability to deal 
with novelty, to change mind sets, to switch modes of responding, to adjust to 
changes?  
Messick (1989) labels a situation where test scores insufficiently reflect the 
construct the test claims to measure as construct under-representation. The issue of 
construct under-representation needs to be addressed – as we did with learning and 
learning tests – by incorporating challenges to the ability to deal with novelty into 
the test situation. An operationalization of this ability requires an understanding of 
what we mean by novelty. Experiences of novelty tend to be accompanied with 
expressions of surprise. In this context, I find it rather surprising how often we are 
surprised whilst rather need not to be; at the same time it is surprising how often we 
are not surprised when we rather ought to be. This conundrum has its origins in the 
fact that novelty tends to come in three disguises. The first form is ostensible novelty. 
This characterises a situation that appears to be novel and unfamiliar although in 
fact, the previous experience or already acquired knowledge and skills would enable 
a person to handle the situation competently. An example for ostensible novelty is 
the transition from left hand traffic to right hand traffic (or vice versa). The second 
form is obscured novelty, where surface features of a situation induce a sense of 
familiarity whilst the underlying structure of the situation would require a novel 
approach. An example for such a situation would be the raising of twins. The third 
form is not really a disguise as such, however, in the potential presence of the other 
two it might be as challenging to correctly identify it. In case of objective or “honest” 
novelty, things appear to be unfamiliar and they are in fact novel so that existing 
experience, already acquired knowledge or skills are not necessarily a sufficient 
basis for handling this situation. Cognitive Flexibility is the ability to tell these 
situations apart and to act accordingly. The inability to do that may lead to 
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surprising failures. After the brief introduction of the three O’s of novelty (i.e., 
ostensible, obscured and objective), I will now share some ideas of how to 
implement these into test situations. 
 
Dynamic Testing of cognitive flexibility 
To measure the ability to deal with ostensible novelty we devised the Flexible 
Mapping Task. The Flexible Mapping Task uses analogies of the type “A is to B as C 
is to ??”. This item paradigm is frequently used in traditional approaches to the 
assessment of fluid intelligence. The test taker is asked to complete an analogy by 
selecting the fourth term that in relation to the third term analogously replicates the 
relationship identified between the first two terms. Figure 4 shows an example of an 
item using words basis stimuli. For the first item (Figure 4a) the correct answer is 
AUTOMOBILE because it usually has three wheels more than a unicycle, which 
replicates the relevant relationship between TWINS and QUINTUPLETS. 
Traditionally, in analogy items, the relationship identified between the first two 
elements must be mapped to another elements from the same domain (see Figure 
4a). To introduce demands to deal with ostensible novelty we systematically vary 
the item context and present the same analogy stem again, but now the third term 
will be from a different domain. For instance, by requiring to map the relationship 
between two words onto the shape domain (Figure 4b) we expect the application of 
the same principle (e.g., “three more”) in an ostensibly novel situation. We repeat 
this challenge by now requiring a mapping into the number domain (Figure 4c).  
Items in the Flexible Mapping Task are presented in triplets. The first item 
within each triplet is always a domain-homogenous item (using either words, 
numbers or shapes as stimuli) whereas the second and third part represents domain-
heterogeneous items where mapping in a different domain is required. The 
intraindividual variability in a test taker’s performance across these two item 
categories (i.e., domain-switching costs) is expected to be indicative of the test taker’s 
ability to deal with ostensible novelty. 
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  b)	  
	   	  	  c)	  
	   	  
 
Figure 4: Example item-triplet from Flexible Mapping Task (panel a: domain-homogenous analogy, 
panels b and c: domain-heterogeneous analogies). 
 
To measure the ability to deal with obscured novelty we propose the Flexible 
Inference Task. The Flexible Inference Task is a classification task. The test taker is 
asked to identify the best match to a set target stimulus based on the properties they 
share. The stimuli in this task are numbers, words or shapes. Figure 5 shows an 
example of an item using numbers. For the first item (Figure 5a) the correct answer 
is the upper left pair, because the sum of both numbers equals the target number on 
top. So far this kind of item does not differ to classification tasks frequently used in 
traditional tests of fluid intelligence. We introduce the demand to deal with novelty 
by presenting the same set of stimuli (i.e., same set of numbers), however, 
rearranged in the subsequent item (Figure 5b). The task remains the same: to find the 
pair that matches best the number on the top. However, now a successful solution 
strategy requires a change of the frame of reference. The inferred rule for the 
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previous problem (arithmetic) is no longer valid. In this example, resistance towards 
perceiving numbers as stimuli which “invite” the execution of arithmetic operations 
is required. If numbers are now perceived as graphical patterns that are 
characterised by features such as angularity or symmetry then it is more likely to 
find the correct answer to this item (which is the bottom left pair because of the 
horizontal symmetry of the images). The same set of stimuli is again rearranged into 
different pairs and the item is presented a third time (Figure 5c). Now an inference 
based on the number of digits leads to the correct answer (top left corner). 
Items in the Flexible Inference Task are presented in triplets (as shown above) 
and informative feedback as to what the correct solution was and why is given 
provided after each item. The first items in each triplet require so-called domain-
typical inferences (e.g., arithmetic-based with numbers, or semantic meaning with 
words). The second and third items, in contrast, require domain-atypical inferences 
(e.g., perceiving numbers as images or number of syllables in words). As an effect, 
we predict a decrease in performance for the transition from domain-typical to 
domain-atypical inferences (i.e. switching costs). However, for the transition 
between the first domain-atypical to the second domain-atypical inference item we 
in fact expect a slight improvement (i.e. “recovery”). Testing these expectations 
empirically will be part of the validation strategy (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & 
Heerden, 2004). To be successful in the Flexible Inference Task a flexible use of 
different frames of reference for familiar stimuli is necessary. The ability to inhibit 
experience gained on previous items is the prerequisite for utilizing different 
cognitive approaches to the same set of stimuli. Generally, we expected that the 
intraindividual variability in performance scores caused by the systematic variation 
within each item triplet will be indicative of test taker’s ability to use their cognitive 
resources flexibly. 
To measure the ability to deal with objective novelty we designed the 
Counterfactual Analogy Task, which is based on an idea discussed by Marr and 
Sternberg (1986, see also Sternberg & Gastel, 1989). In this task verbal analogies are 
first presented with preceding statements of familiar facts relating to the analogy 
stem (factual analogies, see Figure 6a for an example). To introduce the challenge to 
deal with novelty the same item will then be presented with a preceding 
counterfactual statement (counterfactual analogy, see Figure 6b).  
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  c)	  
	   	   
Figure 5: Example item-triplet from Flexible Inference Task (panel a: domain-typical inference, panels 
b and c: domain-atypical inference) 
  
To solve the counterfactual version of the item pair requires the integration of 
novel information (i.e., by considering the counterfactual statement to be true) into 
routine ways of thinking. The intraindividual variability in performance across the 
item pool comprising both factual and counterfactual analogies is expected to be 
indicative of the test taker’s ability to deal with novelty. 
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Figure 6: Example item-pair for Counterfactual Verbal Analogies (panel a: factual analogy, panel b: 
counterfactual analogy). 
 
These three tests aim at measuring the ability to deal with (a) ostensible novelty by 
requiring to map relationships in analogies flexibly (Flexible Mapping Task), (b) 
obscured novelty by requiring to flexibly infer relationships in classifications 
(Flexible Inference Task), and (c) objective novelty by requiring to integrate novel 
information into routine ways of thinking when solving verbal analogies 
(Counterfactual Analogies).  
 
These tests are dynamic tests because they use “… systematic variations of task 
characteristics and / or situational characteristics in the presentation of test items in 
order to evoke intraindividual variability in test performance” (see definition of 
Dynamic Testing introduced earlier in this article). The operational focus in these 
tests is on interindividual differences in intra-individual variation in performance to 
derive valid estimates of a person’s cognitive flexibility.  
The test procedure implemented in these flexibility tests is not dissimilar to 
testing-the-limits, a test approach, when introduced to ability testing (Volle, 1957), 
attempted to bridge standardised assessment on the one hand and a clinical 
palpation of performance areas on the other (Boesch, 1964, p. 938; see also Klopfer & 
Kelley, 1942; Mons, 1955). According to Schmidt (1971, p. 9), in testing-the-limits 
repeated assessments using the same or parallel tasks under the same or 
Flowers	  grow	  in	  gardens. 	   FLAME	  :	  HEAT	  ::	  ROSE	  :	  _____ 	   SCENT BEES	   THORN HONEY 
Flowers	  live	  in	  hives. 	   FLAME	  :	  HEAT	  ::	  ROSE	  :	  _____ 	   SCENT BEES	   THORN HONEY	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systematically varying conditions are employed to pursue three main goals: (1) to 
register intraindividual variability in performance, (2) to determine the modal range 
of this variability, and (3) to identify the internal as well as external factors which 
cause this variation. The ultimate goal of testing-the-limits has been to achieve 
incremental validity to traditional one-off measures. Testing-the-limits can be seen as 
one of the founding blocks of Dynamic Testing8. Other parallels can be seen to so-
called load testing in software engineering or cardiac stress tests in health 
assessments. 
For validating these flexibility tests the same principles apply as outlined 
earlier for dynamic tests aiming at the assessment of learning potential. However, 
the characteristics of the respective target construct and subsequent target 
population in combination with the proposed diagnostic purpose of the test 
determines the qualitative focus in the strategy to establish incremental validity. 
Whilst the identification of “not-yet-manifested potential” as the diagnostic aim in 
learning tests translates into an emphasis on increasing sensitivity the strategy to 
establish incremental validity for flexibility tests has to focus on increasing 
specificity (Figure 3). In other words, learning tests are expected to find “hidden 
gems” whereas flexibility tests are expected to find out whether “it is really gold that 
glitters”. Within a Vygotskian framework, I would argue that learning tests aim at 
the identification of the “zone of proximal development”; cognitive flexibility tests 
aim at the plasticity of the “zone of current development”. One might then speculate 
that sufficient levels of plasticity in maintaining high levels of (cognitive) 
performance indicate adequate consolidation of current developmental 
achievements, which is one precondition for affording a wider horizon when 
venturing into the zone of proximal development. Addressing these kinds of 
research questions would be possible with the utilisation of Dynamic Testing. 
Neither cognitive flexibility nor any of the learning potential-related 
constructs are new constructs as such. Conceptually they all are closely linked to 
intelligence (Guthke & Beckmann, 2001, 2003), where they represent central sub-
facets of intellectual functioning. Operationally, however, they are under-
represented in traditional approaches to the assessment of intelligence. Dynamic 
Testing represents a method to redress this validity threat of construct under-
representation.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Carlson and Wiedl (1978) give an early example of utilising testing-the limits in a Dynamic Testing 
procedure.   
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I used this article as an opportunity to reflect upon potential reasons for the 
adamant perception that Dynamic Testing has not delivered on its promise. I argue 
that this perception might be nurtured by a paradox in our and potential users’ 
conception of Dynamic Testing. It is a paradox between being tendentially too broad 
(or undifferentiated) in our perspective on validity on the one hand and being too 
narrow in our view on the scope of Dynamic Testing on the other.  
 
In summary, the main points made in the first part of this article are that the only 
promise Dynamic Testing could possibly make is regarding its usefulness to the 
psychometric measurement of psychologically relevant constructs. In my view there 
is no direct way to test whether this promise has been kept. The evaluation of its 
usability would have to be achieved rather cumulatively via the validation of 
individual tests that employ Dynamic Testing. This, however, would require that all 
dynamic tests aim at the same construct, which is clearly not the case (see Lidz & 
Elliott, 2000 for example). In order to prevent the infamous mixing of apples and 
oranges9 validation efforts need to start with a clear definition of the target construct. 
From that the decision needs to derive what constitutes an appropriate criterion. The 
construct definition in combination with an explication of the diagnostic purpose of 
the test also circumscribes the target population, which is instrumental to keeping 
clearly focused validity expectations. The general nature of the constructs discussed 
in the context of Dynamic Testing emphasises the importance of incremental 
validity, which primarily becomes a qualitative matter rather than simply aiming for 
“more of the same”. The construct definition, the proposed diagnostic purpose and 
the identified target population determine whether incremental validity is to be 
achieved through an increase in sensitivity or specificity without sacrificing the 
other. With this line of arguments I wish to insinuate that higher levels of explication 
and differentiation in our attempts to validate dynamic tests will be beneficial to 
shaping expectations and to better evaluate which promises are to be kept and 
which ones should not be made.   
In the second part of this paper, I introduced three newly developed tests of 
cognitive flexibility to demonstrate that Dynamic Testing should not be perceived as 
being exclusively tied to a particular construct (or construct family). I suspect such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I wonder whether the risk tends to be slightly greater when an orange is called Apfelsine, 
sinaasappel, or חופת בהז. 
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unproductive claims of ownership10 may contribute to impressions of under-delivery 
on promises that Dynamic Testing should and, in fact, has never made. Dynamic 
Testing is nothing more, but certainly nothing less than a methodological approach 
to assessment. As tools are selected to serve a particular purpose, I optimistically 
assert that it is our progressed theoretical understanding of abilities as dynamic and 
malleable phenomena as opposed to static and fixed traits that requires progressive 
assessment methods to keep pace. I am convinced that Dynamic Testing as a 
methodological approach to assessment will prove not only beneficial but plain 
necessary for a valid measurement of psychologically relevant constructs. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This reminds me of one of the bedtime stories my daughter is bound to enjoy these days. In this 
story, titled “The mushroom in the rain” (Suteyev, V., 1963, Stories and Pictures. Moscow: Progress), 
a range of different animals seeks protection from the pouring rain underneath a mushroom. In the 
beginning there is only room for an ant, but as the rain continues a butterfly, a mouse, a sparrow, 
and, yes, even a rabbit finds shelter underneath the parasol mushroom. As I have tried to argue in 
the second part, the umbrella term “Dynamic Testing” seems broader and more accommodating 
than it appears. Whilst this view might come with additional challenges, I believe it will help us 
realise the under-utilised potential of Dynamic Testing. Thus: Let it rain! Well, and it does rain quite 
often in the North-East of England. 
 22 
References 
Beckmann, J. F. (2001). Zur Validierung des Konstrukts des intellektuellen 
Veränderungspotentials [On the validation of the construct of intellectual change 
potential]. Berlin: logos. 
Beckmann, J. F. (2006). Superiority: Always and everywhere? – On some 
misconceptions in the validation of Dynamic Testing. Educational and Child 
Psychology, 23, 35-49.  
Beckmann, J. F., & Dobat, H. (2000). Zur Validierung der Diagnostik intellektueller 
Lernfähigkeit. [The validation of the diagnostic of intellectual learning abilty]. 
Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie, 14, 97-105.  
Beckmann, J. F., & Guthke, J. (1999). Psychodiagnostik des schlußfolgernden Denkens 
[The assessment of reasoning ability]. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Boesch, E. E. (1964). Die diagnostische Systematisierung. [The diagnostic systematization]. 
In R. Heiss, K. J. Groffmann & L. Michel (Eds.), Handbuch der Psychologie (Vol. 6, pp. 
930-959). Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G. J., & Heerden, J. v. (2004). The concept of validity. 
Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061-1071.  
Carlson, J. S., & Wiedl, K. H. (1978). Use of testing-the-limits procedures in the assessment 
of intellectual capabilities in children with learning difficulties. American Journal of 
Mental Deficiency, 82(6), 559-564.  
Carroll, J. B. (1993). Human cognitive abilities – A survey of factoranalytic studies. New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Chi, M. T. (1997). Creativity: Shifting across ontological categories flexibly. In T. B. Ward, S. 
M. Smith & J. Vaid (Eds.), Creative thought: An investigation of conceptual structures and 
processes (pp. 209-234). Washington DC: American Psychological Association. 
Cronbach, L. J. (1971). Test validation. In R. L. Thorndike (Ed.), Educational Measurement 
(pp. 443-507). Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education. 
Frensch, P. A., & Sternberg, R. J. (1989). Expertise and intelligent thinking: When is it worse 
to know better? 
Garaigordobil, M. (2006). Intervention in creativity with children aged 10 and 11 years: 
Impact of a play program on verbal and graphic-figural creativity. Creativity Research 
Journal, 18(3), 329-345.  
Guthke, J. (1982). The learning test concept - An alternative to the traditional static 
intelligence test. The German Journal of Psychology, 6, 306-324.  
Guthke, J., & Beckmann, J. F. (2000). Learning test concept and dynamic assessment. In A. 
 23 
Kozulin & B. Y. Rand (Eds.), Experience of mediated learning: An impact of Feuerstein's 
theory in education and psychology (pp. 175-190). Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science. 
Guthke, J., & Beckmann, J. F. (2001). Intelligenz als "Lernfähigkeit"—Lerntests als 
Alternative zum herkömmlichen Intelligenztest. [Intelligence as the ability to 
learn – learning tests as alternative to traditional intelligence measures] In E. 
Stern & J. Guthke (Eds.), Perspektiven der Intelligenzforschung. Ein Lehrbuch für 
Fortgeschrittene (S. 137–161). Lengerich: Pabst. 
Guthke, J., & Beckmann, J. F. (2003). Dynamic Assessment with Diagnostic 
Programs. In R. J. Sternberg & J. Lautrey & T. I. Lubart (Eds.), Models of 
intelligence. International perspectives (pp. 227–242). Washington, DC: APA. 
Guthke, J., & Wiedl, K.-H. (1996). Dynamisches Testen. Zur Psychodiagnostik der 
intraindividuellen Variabilität [On the psycho-diagnostic of intraindividual variability]. 
Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Guthke, J., Beckmann, J. F., & Wiedl, K. H. (2003). Dynamik im Dynamischen Testen 
[Dynamics in Dynamic Testing]. Psychologische Rundschau, 54, 225-232.  
Hessels, M. G. P. (2009). Estimation of the predictive validity of the HART by means of a 
dynamic test of geography. Journal of Cognitive Education and Psychology, 8(1), 5-21.  
Hund, A. M., & Plumert, J. M. (2005). The stability and flexibility of spatial categories. 
Cognitive Psychology, 50, 1-44. 
Kliegl, R. & Baltes, P. B. (1987). Theory-guided analysis of development and aging 
mechanisms through testing-the limits and research on expertise. In C. 
Schooler & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Cognitive functioning and social structures over the 
life course, (pp. 95-119). Norwood: Ablex. 
Klopfer, B., & Kelley, D. M. (1942). The Rorschach technique. Yonkers, NY: World Book. 
Kossowska, M., Matthäus, W., & Necka, E. (1996). The cost of being competent: Expertise 
and rigidity in coping with novelty. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 27(1), 25-38.  
Lezak, M. D. (1995). Neuropsychological assessment (3rd ed.). New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lidz, C. S., & Elliott, J. G. (Eds.). (2000). Dynamic assessment: Prevailing models and 
applications. Oxford, UK: Elsevier. 
Marr, D. B., & Sternberg, R. J. (1986). Analogical reasoning with novel concepts: Differential 
attention of intellectually gifted and nongifted children to relevant and irrelevant 
novel stimuli. Cognitive Development, 1(1), 53-72.  
McNemar, Q., (1964). Lost: Our intelligence? Why? American Psychologist, 19, 871-
882. 
 24 
Messick, R. J. (1989). Validity. In R. L. Linn (Ed.), Educational measurement  (3rd ed., 
pp. 13-103). New York, NY: Macmillan. 
Mons, W. E. R. (1955). A normative study of children on the Rorschach test. Zeitschrift für 
diagnostische Psychologie und Persönlichkeitsforschung, 3, 177-180. 
Schmidt, L. R. (1971). Testing the limits im Leistungsverhalten: Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen [Testing the limits in performance: Potentials and limitations. In E. 
Duhm (Ed.), Praxis der klinischen Psychologie (Vol. 2, pp. 9-29). Göttingen: 
Hogrefe. 
Scott, W. A. (1962). Cognitive Complexity and Cognitive Flexibility. Sociometry, 25(4), 405-
414.  
Stern, W. (1914). The psychological methods of testing intelligence (G. M. Whipple, Trans., 
German orig. 1912). Baltimore MD: Warwick & York. 
Sternberg, R. J. (1987). Coping with novelty and human intelligence. In P. Morris (Ed.), 
Modelling cognition (pp. 57-91). New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Sternberg, R. J., & Gastel, J. (1989). If dancers ate their shoes: Inductive reasoning with 
factual and counterfactual premises. Memory & Cognition, 17(1), 1-10.  
Tzuriel, D. (2013). Mediated Learning Experience and Cognitive Modifiability. Journal of 
Cognitive Education and Psychology, 12(1), 59-80.  
Urbina, S. (2004). Essentials of psychological testing. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Volle, F. O. (1957). A proposal for "testing the limits" with mental defectives for the purpose 
of subtest analysis of the WISC verbal scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 13, 64-67.  
Wechsler, D. (1935). The range of human capacities. MD: Williams & Wilkins. 
 	  
